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Power Structures and Divergent Historical Narratives in PostConflict Societies
Christopher Lindrud
Memory is fickle, as perception of the present often distorts
the past. It is with this memory, however, that we shape our
identities through personal experiences along with historical
narratives told by others about the past. In post-conflict societies,
multiple narratives attempting to make sense of the past are often
at odds with each other, vying for cultural dominance and official
recognition. After the signing of treaties and the restoration of
democracy, conflicting narratives linger until they eventually
retrograde from the physical realm into the hearts and memories of
everyday citizens. Multiple interpretations of the same event may
exist, even among members of the same ethnic group, class, or
gender. Negotiating divisions between victims, repressors, and
intersecting identities is further complicated during the process of
commemorating sites of genocide, because the historical narrative
must be factual while also taking cultural and political sensitivities
into consideration. However, given the inherently divisive nature
of memory construction, multiple groups often vie for control of
the official historical narrative surrounding a site of genocide as a
means to legitimize their political power and solidify their
preferred social mores in the wake of the conflict. Ultimately,
internal and external power structures impact how sites of
genocide are commemorated. The genocide sites at Auschwitz and
Srebrenica exemplify how varying levels of international, national,
and local support determine which narratives are emphasized or
omitted.
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In 1947, the Polish communist government, under the
influence of the Soviet Union, established an official Holocaust
museum at Auschwitz at the behest of the Jewish community.
While the Jewish Holocaust was mentioned at the museum,
Auschwitz soon became a communist propaganda tool,
emphasizing “the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany rather
than presenting the historical truth.”1 The historical truth, that the
Red Army was a part of the Allied war effort and committed
wartime atrocities against Poles and various ethnic and religious
minorities, was not featured at the museum. Eventually, the
significance of the Jewish Holocaust was diminished. Instead,
Auschwitz became “an important symbol used in legitimating new
geopolitical alliances…by emphasizing Nazi Germany’s crimes,
moreover, Communists were minimizing the Soviet Union’s own
offenses…against its own civil population or Poland’s.”2
Controlling the historical narrative surrounding Auschwitz became
a critical propaganda tool for the Soviet Union; they casted
themselves as the ultimate victors and valiant saviors of Eastern
Europe, therefore legitimizing the continued post-war Soviet
dominion over the region.
Under the heavy-handed influence of the Soviets, the Polish
communist government suppressed the wide range of religious and
ethnic affiliations within Poland in favor of a singular, unifying
communist identity. The memorial site at Auschwitz is one key
example of the government’s attempt to promote communist unity.
By suppressing the Jewish Holocaust narrative in favor of the
1

Anna Sommer, “Auschwitz Today: Personal Observations and Reflections about
Visitors to the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum and Memorial,” Dans Les Cahiers
Irice, no. 7 (2011): 87–94.
2
Genevieve Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in
Communist Poland (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 104.
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Soviet friendly and politically convenient “triumph over fascism”
narrative, the government erased and replaced Jews’ unique
Holocaust narratives, as well as those of other marginalized
religious and ethnic groups. For example, a Polish communist
propaganda publication in 1963, The Victims of Fascism, listed the
groups interned at Auschwitz as “Americans, Austrians, Belgians,
Britons, Bulgarians, Chinese, Croats, Czechs, Dutchmen,
Egyptians, Frenchmen, Germans, Greeks, Gypsies, Hungarians,
Italians, Jews, Letts, Lithuanians, Norwegians, Persians, Poles,
Romanians, Russians (and other citizens of the Soviet Union),
Slovaks, Spaniards, Swiss, Turks, and Yugoslavs.”3 Communist
propaganda represented Jews as if they were just one of many
groups pursued in the Holocaust rather than the primary target. The
communist government also represented Poles as one of many
victims, though Polish nationalists favored a narrative recasting
themselves as the main victims. Although both groups were
officially recognized as victims, Jews and Polish nationalists alike
resented their diminished victim status, which equated their
suffering to that of much smaller groups like the Chinese or
Persians.
Auschwitz became a quasi-mythicized propaganda tool and
focal point of pro-communist, anti-capitalist political rhetoric.
Speaking to a crowd of thirty thousand enthusiastic civilians in
1950, the Vice Premier of the Polish communist government,
Antoni Korzycki, spoke of the concentration camp as “the wild
beast representing capitalist imperialism in all its hideousness that
revealed itself…that is why it is no accident that on this day, the
fifth anniversary of the liberation of anti-fascist fighters around the
world we hold here, on the fields of Birkenau, a commemorative
3

Ibid.
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ceremony.”4 Communist politicians used the tangible remains of
Auschwitz to promote an intangible, ideological dichotomy
between the Soviet communist heroes and the capitalist Nazi
villains. Auschwitz was used as a political tool to both validate the
acclaimed merits of the new Polish government and to
propagandize the potential dangers of rogue capitalism supposedly
championed by the West.
When Polish nationalists objected to the communist
narrative, the communist government attempted to appease them
by validating their victim narrative by portraying “Polish Citizens”
as martyrs and the Soviets as their valiant savior from fascism. As
the Soviet-sympathizing Poles consolidated power within the
Polish government, “the Jewish experience of the war became
politicized and saw its fate landed with that of the Polish
experience.”5 Jewish history was absorbed into the larger Polish
history, as Auschwitz became a place that exclusively persecuted
“Polish citizens” rather than Polish Jews. The communist
government allowed the Polish nationalist victim narrative to exist
at Auschwitz as long as it did not undermine the overarching
Soviet hero narrative; however, minority groups without a
politically useful narrative, like the Jews, were omitted from the
historical narrative of Auschwitz. Although Soviet ideology
explicitly rejected ties to both religious and national identities—in
favor of promoting an overarching and globally unified communist
identity—the Soviets leveraged the political convenience of the
Polish nationalist narrative. On one hand, the Polish nationalist
narrative amplified anti-German and anti-Western sentiment, two
4

Jonathan Huener, Auschwitz, Poland and the Politics of Commemoration, 1945–1979,
(Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), 42.
5
Sommer, “Auschwitz Today,” 87–94.
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linchpins of Soviet ideology. On the other hand, the Polish
nationalist narrative undermined the Jewish narrative, furthering
the Soviet stance that religious identity was dispensable and
unimportant.
The influential undercurrent of Polish nationalists wanted to
twist the historical interpretation of the Holocaust in its favor.
These nationalists perceived both the communist government and
ethnic minorities, like Jews, as disloyal fifth columns that
prevented a sovereign and “ethnically pure” Polish state. Ethnic
and political divisions increased in the decades following WWII,
with Catholic Polish nationalists growing increasingly suspicious
of Jews and communists. Many Jews “supported the communist
regime because it promised equality and social mobility, that, after
1945, they were allowed to occupy positions once prohibited.”6 A
minority of Jews adopted Slavic surnames to fit the Soviet mold
and to better integrate into an antisemitic Polish society while still
privately preserving their religious identities. However, this caused
great suspicion among Catholic Poles, who felt threatened by what
they considered to be a Jewish elite power play through communist
collaboration; “The result was a consolidation of two traditional
stereotypes, the Polish-Catholic on the one hand, and the JudeoCommunist on the other…A Polish-Catholic was now, as always, a
defender of the fatherland, with its tradition, culture and religion,
against the communist power imposed by the Soviets and
exercised on their behalf by the Jews.”7 By attempting to erase
religious identities, the Soviets and Soviet-sympathizing Poles
stoked fears among Polish nationalists that Jews were secretly
6

Carla Tonini, “The Jews in Poland after the Second World War. Most Recent
Contributions of Polish Historiography,” Journal of Fondazione CDEC, no. 1 (2010).
7
Aleksander Smolar, “Jews as a Polish Problem,” Daedalus 116, no. 2 (1987): 31–73.
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plotting to destroy the “traditional” (i.e., Catholic) Polish identity.
Auschwitz became an increasingly important site to validate the
Polish nationalists’ martyr narrative, as opposed to the allegedly
“unpatriotic” Jewish Holocaust narrative.
Antisemitic suspicion culminated with the 1968 political
crisis in Poland. Polish nationalists scapegoated Jews for a myriad
of political, social, and economic failures, which were actually
products of myopic policies enacted by the communist
government. The Polish economy stagnated, and the end of the
Prague Spring in neighboring Czechoslovakia heightened ethnopolitical tensions across the Soviet-controlled region.
Subsequently, Polish nationalists perceived internal and
neighboring conflicts as evidence of an impending Judeocommunist takeover.
Being integrated into the communist government power
structure provided some Jews with a sense of security against the
Polish nationalists. However, increasing Soviet-Israeli tensions
decreased even politically powerful Jews’ protection. In response
to the Soviet Union’s tenuous diplomatic relations with Israel, the
Polish communist government, essentially a puppet state of the
USSR, launched an antisemitic propaganda campaign, which
forced “20,000 Jews to flee the country, leading to the Jewish
presence in Poland of 12,000 people.”8 In the wake of renewed
Jewish persecution in Poland, “anti-Semitism, once used as a
weapon against the ruling establishment, now serve[d] as evidence
that the establishment ha[d] finally broken free from a foreign
element. The government was no longer Jewish-cosmopolitan; it
had become Polish-national.”9 Until then, Jews could participate in
8
9

Tonini, “The Jews in Poland after the Second World War.”
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the political system in Poland, while still remaining subservient to
the greater will of the Soviet Union. Yet, once relations between
Israel and the Eastern Block soured, Jews were purged from nearly
all political institutions in communist Poland.
With an even smaller contingent of Jews remaining in
Poland, the Auschwitz Museum became exclusively “dedicated to
the commemoration of the international anti-fascist struggle and
martyrology…the word Jew could hardly be found at all.”10
Immediately after WWII, the communist government gave Jewish
groups space, albeit limited, to commemorate Jewish victims of the
Holocaust. But as the decades progressed, political, social, and
economic factors, both internally and internationally, resulted in
negative, inaccurate, and myopic portrayals of Jewish experiences
of the Holocaust. On one hand, Polish nationalists depicted Jews as
communist collaborators. On the other, rather than taking
responsibility for its role in perpetuating political and social
sectarianism in conjunction with pervasive economic inequality,
the communist government scapegoated Jews as the source of the
country’s deterioration.
After the 1968 Jewish political purge, Polish nationalists
assumed the positions of power left vacant by the expelled Jewish
population. Political and ethnic tensions both within the Polish
communist administration and Polish society as a whole translated
into a paralleled exclusion of the Jewish victim narrative at the
Auschwitz Museum. Instead, Auschwitz became a battleground
between the Polish nationalist victim narrative and communist
“triumph over fascism” narrative. Nationalists and communists
vied for power within the national bureaucracy and for the power
10

Jan Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz (New York, NY: Random
House Publishing, 2006), 243.
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to shape the collective memory of the Holocaust at Auschwitz. As
tensions exponentially increased between the two groups, both
simultaneously sought to suppress the Jewish narrative.
An authoritative national government, marginalized groups’
limited access to positions of power, and infighting among
nationalists and communists resulted in Auschwitz becoming a
propaganda tool rather than a site commemorating all victims of
the Holocaust. Although Jewish groups lobbied for a museum to be
built at the Auschwitz genocide site, the museum was administered
by the Polish government, meaning Jews had little control over
their own narrative within the context of early communist
Poland.11 The multi-level power dynamic of communist Poland led
to the use of Auschwitz as a vehicle for propaganda that bolstered
Polish nationalism and the Soviet communist agenda, both of
which eclipsed the suffering of many victims and survivors.
Ultimately, whichever group controlled the political direction of
post-war Poland also by default controlled the historical narrative
of the Auschwitz memorial site.
Identity politics in communist Poland—and the government’s
control over the official historical narrative of Auschwitz—
exemplified how authoritarian power structures justify their rule by
shaping the narratives of sites of genocide. Obfuscating the Jewish
identity in relation to the Holocaust became a convenient tactic
used by both the Polish and communist forces to advance their
respective political and social agendas. While the communists used
Auschwitz to legitimize their political control over the Eastern
Block, the Polish Nationalists used the site to reaffirm their social
and cultural dominion by casting the Holocaust as an event which
persecuted victims for their national identity rather than religious
11

Sommer, “Auschwitz Today,” 87–94.
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or ethnic affiliations. Despite representing different interests, the
communist and Polish Nationalist narratives aligned to promote an
overarching anti-Western and anti-fifth column narrative with
which Jews were often associated. Both narratives were able to
coexist in relative lockstep because they ultimately permitted both
the Polish Nationalists and communists to pursue their respective
interests by suppressing the political and cultural influence of
minority groups within post-war Poland.
In contrast, in post-genocide Bosnia, a relatively weak and
disjointed national government passively made room for grassroots
movements to assert their own respective historical narratives. The
political landscape of post-war Bosnia possessed a myriad of often
overlapping divisions and subdivisions drawn along ethnic lines.
The geopolitically divided nature of Bosnia translated into a
similarly fragmented collective perception of the past, because
sites of genocide against Bosnian Muslims were often within
Bosnian/Serbian non-Muslim lands.
Srebrenica, the most infamous site of genocide in Bosnia, lies
within the ethnically Serbian administered “Republic of Sreprska,”
meaning commemorative measures must take geopolitical,
historical, and cultural sensitivities into consideration to avoid
reigniting latent ethnic tensions. For example, the sprawling white
pillar grave sites for the thousands of Bosnian male victims
visually alludes to a typical military-style grave site set aside for
fallen heroes of war.12 While attempting to create a somber
memorial to the slaughtered Bosnian men, the military-style graves
subtly give credence to the Serbian narrative that the conflict was a
civil war (rather than a genocide), in which both sides fought on
12

Lara Nettlefield, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 43.
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equal footing and those who perished died so in the “glory” of the
battlefield—instead of defenseless in a mass slaughter.
Women and men suffered different fates in Srebrenica, with
women facing sexual violence while men were summarily
executed. Despite both groups’ experiences, only men were visibly
commemorated. Bosnian culture, however, “associates the
sexuality of women with the honor and dignity of the patriarchal
family. Within this cultural framework, the violation of a daughter
or wife is thus construed as the violation of a husband or father.”13
Thus, any perceived injustice against a woman was considered as
an egregious, and potentially shameful, affront against a woman’s
entire family. For example, one Bosnian mother and survivor of
sexual violence reported: “[W]e were raised in a patriarchal way.
This [Srebrenica] is a small village. I believe they are ashamed to
tell their brothers, their children.”14 Furthermore, “because the
memory of the raped body is marked by personal, familial, and
national degradation, memorializing this suffering and honoring
those who survived the violence are antithetical to the project of
nation building and ethnic pride.”15 Due to rigid gender
expectations, the overarching narrative could not include Bosnian
women’s experiences of sexual violence. Additionally, gender
expectations limited Bosnian women’s participation in the
commemorative process because they could only participate if they
were doing so on behalf of the fallen men.
The social upheaval resultant from the genocide required
Bosnian women to claim new social roles within their community.
13

Janet Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica: Gender and the Social Meanings of
Collective Memory in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Memory Studies 10, no. 4 (2017): 423–39.
14
Elissa Bemporad, Women and Genocide: Survivors, Victims and Perpetrators
(Bloomington, ID: Indiana University Press, 2018), 258.
15
Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica,” 423–39.
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With women vastly outnumbering male survivors, women began to
“physically attend the individual burials at the memorial
centre…the space has also helped redefine the role of women
among the post-war community of Srebrenica. Whereas before the
war—before the violent rupture of the genocide—according to
traditional Bosnian Muslim practice, women would not have been
present in the cemetery for such events, they now take their place
at the gravesite as mourners and attendants of the dead.”16 The
social disruption caused by the genocide enabled Bosnian women
to take on cultural roles that had traditionally been exclusively
reserved for male members of the community. Although still living
in a patriarchal society, women were empowered, albeit tragically,
to take the commemorative process into their own hands. Thus,
Bosnian women survivors directly participated in constructing the
historical narrative of Srebrenica, a previously inaccessible cultural
opportunity.
To participate in the commemorative process, Bosnian
women had to operate within a framework that was palatable to
Serbia’s cultural patriarchy. Female survivors organized the
Mothers of Srebrenica to commemorate the fallen male members
of their families. The group protested the unjust killings of their
loved ones and “also conducted an extensive poll in which a vast
majority of the respondents supported the creation of a national
cemetery in Srebrenica where the remains of their loved ones, once
recovered, could be buried.”17 Advocating on behalf of the fallen
males in their community was the only means through which
women could also advocate for themselves. With the patriarchal
16

Sarah Wagner, Tabulating Loss, Entombing Memory: The Srebrenica-Potocari Centre.
(Leiden, UK: Brill Publishing, 2010), 61–78.
17
Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica,” 423–39.
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Bosnian nuclear family unit, an attack on the husband translated
into an attack on the whole family. Therefore, women sought to
“speak on behalf of the dead, as part of their claim for legitimacy
in shaping the future.”18 By protesting the death of their male loved
ones, the Mothers of Srebrenica sought to memorialize the men as
an all-encompassing symbol of the family’s suffering.
Even within pro-Bosnian commemorative advocacy efforts,
women’s groups disagreed about how to properly memorialize
suffering. While the Mothers of Srebrenica advocated for a site to
commemorate their husbands, other groups (like the Association of
Women Victims of War) wanted to specifically include mass
sexual violence into the official narrative, despite potentially
offending Bosnian social norms. The Association of Women
Victims of War aims “to collect documents and archive materials,
to analyze information and data on every aspect of female
suffering during the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”19 By
rejecting the official narrative’s omission of sexual violence, “the
small organization stands as a kind of counter-memorial to
Srebrenica.”20 While the official narrative still perpetuates the
patriarchally imbedded view of female survivors as mothers
lamenting the loss of their male family members, the existence of
groups promoting a counter-narrative is critical to Bosnians’
collective memory because the groups provide an alternative
means through which more survivors’ experiences are validated
with greater nuance and visibility.
The disjointed, decentralized, and relatively weak nature of
the Bosnian national government created a power vacuum wherein
18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
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multiple grassroots advocacy organizations could unify and lobby
for their respective interests, unlike communist Poland’s more
authoritarian and centralized society where strong governmental
institutions hampered citizen influence. While there were
challenges to the overarching narrative promoted by the influential
Mothers of Srebrenica, Serbian nationalists constructed Karvica,
an alternate memorial site near Srebrenica, which promotes a
narrative that Bosnian Serbs, rather than Bosnian Muslims, were
the true victims of the war. “Rather than building a cohesive
national identity around shared experiences of loss and violence,
the reclaimed landscapes and commemorative spaces explicitly
tabulating loss often exacerbate communal divisions among
Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs.”21 Instead of commemorating the war
as a tragedy on the national level, each sub-group within the nation
commemorated their own, and often conflicting, perception of the
war.
The power vacuum created by a disjointed, leadershipsharing political system in Bosnia has translated into a similarly
disjoined collective memory within the nation. While the variety of
historical narratives allows for all citizens to have their respective
narrative validated, by validating all narratives, no single truth
prevails. For example, multiple monuments on a single memorial
site might commemorate the same event. However, the historical
narrative of this single event might diverge greatly depending on
whether the monument was meant to capture a Bosnian or Serbian
perspective. The absence of an absolute truth pertaining to the
genocide has established a system where political and cultural

21

Sarah Wagner, Tabulating Loss, Entombing Memory: The Srebrenica-Potocari Centre
(Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2010), 61–78.
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divisions are deeply entrenched in Bosnian society, creating
generations of distrust among different identity groups.
In both post-war Poland and Bosnia, the collective memory
of genocide was divided along ethnic and political lines. The
strength and design of government institutions in both countries,
and the group in power, determined which narrative reigned
supreme, if any. By claiming ownership over the generally
accepted historical narrative: Memorialization is one arena in
which competing (and occasionally overlapping) actors and
interest groups—from the state to civic activist groups, local
communities and private individuals—stake their claims to speak
on behalf of the dead, as part of their claim for legitimacy in
shaping the future.22
In post-war Poland, an authoritarian government bolstered by
an omnipresent Soviet influence laid the foundations for a proSoviet, communist narrative to dominate official discourse, while a
strong and widespread undercurrent of Polish nationalism sought
to usurp the official narrative of the Holocaust in favor of a
narrative that validated a Polish ethno-nationalist martyrdom
narrative. Because communist and nationalist forces were vying
for cultural, political, and social dominance, as well as control over
Auschwitz’s historical narratives, victims of the Holocaust with
minimal representation within the dominant governmental power
structure, like Jews, had little room to advocate for their own
narrative.
Conversely, in Bosnia, political infighting amongst Bosnian
Muslims, Serbs, and relatively disjointed bureaucratic instructions
created space for grassroots organizations, like the Mothers of
22

Rebecca Jinks, “Thinking comparatively about genocide memorialization,” Journal of
Genocide Research 16, no. 4 (2014): 423–40.
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Srebrenica, to assert their own narrative of the genocide. Jewish
groups were initially allowed to participate within the power
structure in communist Poland, but once purged, their narrative
was summarily erased and replaced by the agendas of the
communists and nationalists. Women’s groups in Bosnia, however,
were restricted from participating in the public sphere altogether.
Therefore, women’s groups had to challenge the dominant societal
power structure to successfully bring visibility to their cause. It is
important to recognize, though, that the most influential women’s
group, the Mothers of Srebrenica, still conformed to the cultural
and societal expectations of femininity. By casting themselves as
mothers lamenting their fallen male family members, they aligned
themselves with a more palatable narrative—unlike the more
subversive agenda of the Association of Women Victims of War—
to promote a narrative that officially recognized sexual violence.
The Jewish groups in communist Poland and women’s groups in
Bosnia advocated for their respective interests within the political
and social constraints of their society. However, the weak and
disjointed power structures in Bosnia enabled grassroots
organizations to supplement their own narratives, whereas the
strong authoritarian institutions in communist Poland prevented
minority group narratives from competing with more widely
accepted ones.
In post-conflict societies, the challenge of consolidating a
single historical narrative parallels the challenge of reconstructing
political institutions. The power vacuums left in the wake of
genocide often create space for an overarching societal reordering,
and the group which rises to the top of the newly formed power
structures ultimately gets to claim ownership over the official
historical narrative of the past conflict. Memory politics
83
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surrounding Auschwitz and Srebrenica, in Poland and Bosnia
respectively, exemplify how the strength and organization of
political institutions in post-conflict societies impact the ability of
minority groups to advocate for their interests. Memory politics in
post-conflict societies can take a myriad of forms, but ultimately,
the structure of political institutions governing the post-conflict
nation determines the level of influence underrepresented groups
have in the commemorative process.
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